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ABSTRACT
The work proposed in this presentation builds on the foundation set by the DTRA funded 
demonstration project begun in 2000 and completed in December of 2003. This previous 
work consisted of two phases whose overall objective was to install portal radiation 
monitors at four select ports-of-entry in Uzbekistan (Tashkent International Airport, 
Gisht-Kuprik (Kazakhstan border), Alat (Turkmenistan border), and Termez 
(Afghanistan border) in order to demonstrate their effectiveness in preventing the illicit 
trafficking of nuclear materials. The objectives also included developing and 
demonstrating capabilities in the design, installation, operation, training, and maintenance 
of a radiation portal monitoring system. The system and demonstration project has 
proved successful in many ways. An effective working relationship among the 
Uzbekistan Customs Services, Uzbekistan Border Guards, and Uzbekistan Institute of 
Nuclear Physics has been developed. There has been unprecedented openness with the 
sharing of portal monitor data with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The 
system has proved to be effective, with detection of illicit trafficking, and, at Alat, an 
arrest of three persons illegally transporting radioactive materials into Turkmenistan. The 
demonstration project has made Uzbekistan a model nonproliferation state in Central 
Asia and, with an expanded program, places them in a position to seal a likely transit 
route for illicit nuclear materials. These results will be described. In addition, this work is 
currently being expanded to include additional ports-of-entry in Uzbekistan. The process 
for deciding on which additional ports-of-entry to equip will also be described.
INTRODUCTION
Central Asia is a historic center for transport of freight of high commercial value. 
Currently, illicit trafficking through Central Asia includes drugs from Afghanistan and 
Pakistan and nuclear materials from points north to points south; these two trades are 
likely connected. Uzbekistan (UZ) is one nexus for this trade. By identifying likely 
sources and users of nuclear material, it is possible to estimate trade routes and develop a 
prioritized list of ports-of-entry (POE) to intercept nuclear materials.
The former Soviet nuclear complex in Russia remains as the greatest potential source for
illicit nuclear materials. There are eight (8) major nuclear sites in the Moscow vicinity 
and seven (7) in the Chelyabinsk region, making these the two most likely origins of 
illicit nuclear material. Potential users of illicit nuclear materials include states, like Iran, 
and sub-state groups. Users of highly enriched uranium and plutonium are most probably 
limited to states because of the degree of sophistication and technical infrastructure 
required to develop weapons with it. Other nuclear and radioactive materials could be 
used by a variety of organizations in radioactive dispersal devices, a relatively low 
technology weapon.
Interception of illicit nuclear and radioactive material in Central Asia states demonstrate 
that it is a smuggling route; several of these interceptions were via the current radiation 
detection monitoring system in UZ. The supply-demand geography implies a general 
north-to-south flow of material. Railroads are very high priority smuggling routes. 
Railroads account for about 70% of the legitimate trade; there is also a significant record 
of drug-related arrests using rail. The two major north-south rail routes in UZ are Keles-
Khodjidavlet and Karakalpakia-Khodjidavlet. Drug trafficking, likely smuggling routes, 
POE traffic volume, and trade volumes indicate that the Kazakhstan-UZ highway POE is 
high priority.
Figure 1.  Location of international ports-of-entry in Uzbekistan.
An indirect measure of vehicle traffic through UZ POE is highway traffic in Uzbekistan 
on roads leading to the POE (Table 1). These data are in a UN database and reported 
from an official non-customs service source. A qualitative independent assessment of 
both rail and highway traffic volumes can be obtained from trade data (Table 2). 
Excluding trade with Central Asia, 65% of the total trade comes from either Russia or 
Europe; this rises to 76% with the inclusion of Kazakhstan. This north-south trade 
suggests that the Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan POE should have the greatest freight traffic. 
The Central Asia trade data shows that total trade volume is greatest with Kazakhstan 
followed by Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan. This again suggests that the 
Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan POE should have the greatest traffic volume for traded goods.
Port-of- UZ Customs, 2004 UNESCAP, 2002b 
Entry Undated 2001 2002 2003 UZ Border State 
Alat 15,900. 18,700. 25,898. 5,191. 
Andarkhon 12,250. 
Arnasai 71,750. 
Avangard 5,250. 
Ayritom 0. 900. 18,838. 272. 
Daut-Ata 9,100. 7,100. 11,317. 
Dustlik 36,750. 24,572. 15,725. 8,419. 8,503. 554. (KG) 
Gisht-Kuprik 7,300. 5,800. 30,421. 5,468. 6,742. (KZ) 
Gulbakhor 216. 35. 45. 
Jar-Tepa 18,550. 
Kara-Kamar 263. 219. 61. 
Khanabad 8,940. 9,439. 0. 
Keskanyor 1,014. 2,270. 0. 
Madanyat 4,268. 4,002. 4,341. 
Navoi 21,000. 12,300. 11,400. 39,265. 
Oybek 19,250. 4,700. 5,200. 17,007. 6,227. 
Sary-Assia 8,400. 3,000 5,200. 12,473. 1,544. 3,388. (TI) 
Shavat 3,500. 
Uch-Kurgan 57,750. 
Yallama 26,250. 700. 900. 12,709. 
Total 280,700. 92,273. 86,890. 180,794. 
Table 1: Annual Two-Way Vehicle Traffic at International Ports-of-Entry
Trading Partner Export Import Total 
Russia 311. 499. 801. 
Central Asia 288. 391. 679. 
Kazakhstan 79. 178. 257. 
Tajikistan 120. 80. 200. 
Turkmenistan 34. 102. 136. 
Kyrgyzstan 55. 31. 86. 
Europe* 268 141. 409. 
Ukraine 193. 150. 343. 
Korea 88. 207. 295. 
North America 79. 154. 233. 
China 25. 116. 141. 
Other Asian States 66. 9. 75. 
India & Pakistan 16. 20. 36. 
Middle East 3. 22. 25. 
Caucasus 14. 5. 19. 
Africa 5. — 5. 
South & Central America 4. — 4. 
Table 2.  Rank Order of Trade Among Uzbekistan and Trading Partners in $US M
PREVIOUS SMUGGLING
From the global perspective, Central Asia has been about transit – moving objects of
commercial value from outside the region through Central Asia to distant commercial 
centers. From the possible origin of the wheel, through the Silk Road, to the current illicit 
shipments of nuclear material, drugs, and arms, to the future transport of petroleum to the 
world market, Central Asia has remained a nexus of transport. Transport of legitimate 
commercial goods is commonly accompanied by smuggling. Central Asia lies between 
sources of nuclear and radioactive materials in Russia and potential customers in Iran and 
Pakistan. It also lies between sources of opiates (primarily Afghanistan) and buyers
in Russia and Europe. These latter bear special importance because they point to border
locations that have been compromised and it is the compromise that is most critical and 
not necessarily the material being smuggled. For example, on 03/30/2000, Uzbeki 
customs officials seized an Iranian-registered, Iranian-driven truck and a load of scrap 
metal heading from Kazakhstan to Pakistan (and presumably on to Iran) when the load 
set off radiation detectors. The seizure occurred about 20km from Tashkent. Kasakhstani 
customs had cleared the truck and issued a certificate saying it had passed radiation 
screening, and later admitted that the radioactive cargo had been mistakenly allowed to 
cross over the border into Uzbekistan. Official notification to the IAEA was made by 
Kazakhstan. Available press reports, although often sensationalistic, appear to indicate 
that there was no intention to transport radioactive materials: the radioactive 
contamination was likely due to poor release procedures at the original source. On 
06/29/2000, Kazakhstan officials seized 4 kg of 3.6% enriched LEU in Almaty. 
According to press information the suspects had expected to sell the LEU pellets for 
100,000 dollars. The material was due to be taken to Afghanistan and then later 
transferred to Iran. The suspects are described as a citizen of Uzbekistan, assisted by two 
local residents.
INITIAL WORK
Since 2000, the Uzbekistan Customs Services, Uzbekistan Border Guards, and 
Uzbekistan Institute of Nuclear Physics has worked with Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory on a DoD funded project to install radiation portal monitors as a 
demonstration project at high priority ports-of-entry. This included installing pedestrian 
and vehicle monitors at Gisht-Kuprik on the border with Kazakhstan, vehicle monitors at 
Alat on the border with Turkmenistan and at Termiz on the border with Afghanistan, and 
pedestrian monitors at the Tashkent International Airport. A representative schematic 
based on Alat is shown in Figure 2, with Figure 3 depicting the overall installation . The 
central concept of this system is to increase the risk to smugglers. Smugglers will be most 
influenced by the risks they face, rather than the costs of smuggling, as the price per mass 
of the material is very high, and obtaining it is very difficult.
Figure 2.  Schematic of portal monitor installation at Alat.
Figure 3.  Alat POE showing the vehicle entry/exit on the left and the truck entry weight 
station on the right. The photograph is taken looking towards Uzbekistan.
DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
Numerous specifications were placed on the commercially available portal monitoring 
equipment. Pedestrian, vehicle, and rail monitors were specified depending on the POE. 
Enclosure(s) shall be provided for outdoor assemblies and shall be designed so monitors 
will not deteriorate during a period of five years under field conditions. The detection 
assemblies for road and rail vehicle monitoring may be subjected to vibration due to the 
weight of vehicles being monitored. Mounting techniques (i.e. concrete pads) which are 
not described here shall be designed to prevent normal vibrations and shocks of vehicle 
traffic from interfering with the operation of the detection system. Controls and 
adjustments which affect calibration and alarm settings shall be designed so that access to 
them is limited to authorized persons. Provisions shall be made to permit testing of visual 
or sound warning indicators. The monitoring system shall:
· be equipped with the occupancy sensor, which determines the presence of 
the object inside the portal monitor;
· have the ability to communicate signals from each detector or detection 
assembly and the occupancy sensor to a remote computer;
· be equipped with a high-resolution surveillance camera which constantly 
monitors the traffic going through the portal monitors. The live feed from 
the camera must be transmitted to the remote station. In an alarm event, 
the images of the object that triggered an alarm must be stored in the alarm 
log.
· continuously indicate that it is in an operational or non-operational 
condition.
Fault detection such as loss of high voltage, low count-rate, high count-rate, calibration 
expired, or other electronic failures shall be indicated. Testing throughout the standard 
shall be performed with encapsulated, but otherwise, unshielded point sources. The 
monitoring system shall communicate, save, and store time history data for later retrieval 
including background readings prior to and/or after an alarm; the alarm information shall 
include time and date. Communication capabilities are accomplished by providing 
outputs (e.g. via Ethernet) to external computers. Data transfer techniques and format 
methods shall be fully described by the manufacturer and should be based on available 
technology. The monitor shall be capable of providing a local indication and alarm signal 
(visual and audio), and of transmitting these signals to an additional remote station at a 
distance of at least 50 m. Finally, the operational availability of the portal monitors must 
be 99%, i.e. less than 4 days out of operation per year. Operating temperature was to be –
25˚C to + 50˚C, with relative humidity up to 100% at + 40˚C.
Monitors should be tested for both gamma and neutron response. At a background level 
of not more than 20 µR/h ( 0.2Sv), an alarm shall be triggered when the exposure rate is 
increased due to the exposure of the monitor to the sources listed in Table 3 for a 
minimum duration specified by the manufacture at the test speed for dynamic-mode 
systems. The probability of detecting this alarm condition should be greater than or equal 
to 0.90 with 95% confidence, i.e. 59 alarms in 60 passages. This requirement shall be 
fulfilled over a continuous incident gamma energy range from 60 keV to 2.6 MeV (tested 
with 241Am, 228Th, 137Cs, 133Ba, 60Co, and 57Co).
Radionuclide Primary Gamma Energies (keV)b Evaluation test source activitya
228Th 29.38, 86.53, 459.30 7 mCi (0.26 MBq)
241Am 59.53 462 mCi (17 MBq)
57Co 122.06 93 mCi (3.5 MBq)
133Ba 356.00, 80.99, 302.85 23 mCi (0.85 MBq)
137Cs 661.61 16 mCi (0.6 MBq)
60Co 1,173.23, 1,332.50 4 mCi (0.15 MBq)
Neutron (252Cf) — 2x104 n/s ±20%
Table 3.  Activity values for gamma ray and neutron sources.
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
Operations were divided into the customary primary, secondary, and additional expert 
screening categories. The functionality of the portal monitors must be checked daily 
using gamma and neutron radiation check sources provided to the customs officials. In an 
event of a primary alarm, in order to avoid false detection and if the situation permits, the 
alarming object/person should be made to pass through the monitor again. An object that 
triggered an alarm at the portal monitor is directed to the secondary radiation screening. 
After the secondary screening, customs officers may call for additional expert screening. 
This may become necessary when isotopic identification was not successful or when 
additional equipment is needed (such as for x-ray, weighing, etc.). The additional expert 
screening is conducted with the use of spectroscopy detectors in designated places by 
specially trained customs personnel or by the qualified experts from approved 
organizations. At the end of the additional expert screening, a report is created which 
addresses such questions as
- does cargo contain radioactive material
- does cargo contain radioactive waste
- what is the isotopic composition of the radioactive material
- what is the activity of the radioisotopes present in the cargo
- threat assessment
- recommendations on the course of action
Based on the report, custom officials must decide on what administrative action must be 
taken (such as impound the vehicle, not allow to pass, clear to proceed, detain etc.). 
Figure 4 illustrates the concept of operations logical flow chart.
Figure 4.  Concept-of-Operations flow chart.
CONCLUSIONS
The prioritized categorization of international POE was formed by considering the four 
identified factors. Of these four, likely nuclear materials smuggling routes and known
POE compromises from drug trafficking are deemed as the most important and are the 
primary factors by which POE have been categorized as a 1 or 2. Coincidentally, many of 
the category 1 and 2 POE are also high traffic volume POE but not all. For example, one 
POE has a low traffic volume but is a category 2 because it sits astride a likely route and 
all of the truck traffic is from Russia. Though some of the category 1 and 2 POE have 
some concerns related to the ability to secure the border in the immediate vicinity of the 
POE, none of these concerns is large. In contrast, traffic volumes and the ability to secure 
the border in the immediate vicinity of the POE are important for the category 3 and 4 
POE.
The inability to confirm written UZSCC traffic volume data prevents its quantitative use,
especially in prioritization. However, its qualitative use coupled with personal 
observations of the scale of operations at the POE are consistent with classification of 
POE in category 1 and 2.
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